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I am offering an explanation to the “heartless rich effect”, in which I 
attempt to demonstrate why individuals who are in the “middle” position 
exhibit higher prosocial tendencies than their “superior” counterparts.  
 
The sense of being rich or superior is flexibly dependent on available 
comparison target. An individual may perceive himself/herself as richer 
when there is a social comparison target who earns less (being in a 
superior position in a social comparison). However, he/she may not feel so 
when a social comparison target who earns more is also present. In this 
instance, the individual is in the middle position in the social comparison 
context.  
 
Across the 7 studies, the findings suggest that being in the middle position 
compared to being in a superior position, whether in financial or 
non-financial terms, can increase individuals’ prosocial tendency towards 
the inferior comparison target. The effect is mediated by perspective taking, 
and the activated perspective taking process induced by the social 
comparison can be carried over to others who need help. 
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A recent nationwide survey, conducted by The Chronicle of Philanthropy 
(2012), showed that, in America, individuals with higher incomes give 
proportionally less to charity than their lower income counterparts, a finding 
that seems to be consistent with popular existing perceptions about the 
“heartless rich”. Efforts to explain this difference in prosocial proclivity, 
however, remain sparse.  Current practices employed to encourage the rich to 
donate more, for example through favorable tax treatment (Dehne et al. 2008), 
appear to be ineffective in addressing the imbalance.  
 
One reason for the disparity between the giving habits of richer and poorer 
individuals may be that certain personality traits, which cause individuals to 
perform well economically in the first place, may also tend to reflect a reduced 
tendency to give.  Erkal et al. (2011) found that individuals who are more 
“self-regarding”, compared to those who are more “other-regarding”, work 
harder in competitive incentivized tasks. As a result, the former tend to do 
better in the workplace, and earn more from their efforts. It is suggested that 
“self-regarding” individuals generate more perceived utility from maximizing 
their personal monetary payoff, whereas “other-regarding” individuals are 
more willing to help without anticipating monetary gain. This suggests a 
self-selection basis for the “heartless rich” observation.  The rich may simply 
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be, by their very disposition, inherently more “self-regarding” and therefore 
less predisposed to philanthropy. Piff et al. (2010) have supported this 
dispositional explanation by showing that higher class individuals tend to 
prioritize self-interest over the wellbeing of others.  Less affluent individuals 
orient more to the welfare of others. 
 
Though these explanations add to our understanding of the disparity in giving 
habits, situational factors, as opposed to chronic disposition, may also have a 
role in helping to understand the “heartless rich” effect. Certainly, in the 
opinion of the author, “other-regarding” individuals don’t necessarily always 
exert less effort than “self-regarding” individuals in a competitive setting.  
This is, at best, an oversimplification.  In this research, therefore, “being 
rich” is regarded not as involving any universal absolute criteria, but is 
considered rather in a relative comparative sense that may differ in various 
social and economic contexts. Indeed, the academic literature in social 
psychology suggests that having a relative sense of being superior is more 
powerful than objective feedback in influencing performance judgment and 
tendency toward philanthropy (e.g., Klein 2003). This relative perspective is 
also consistent with evidence in neuroscience about the human brain’s 





Hence, in this research, any definition of an individual as being rich or 
economically superior is flexibly applied.  It depends on that individual’s 
social context. An individual may perceive himself or herself to be more 
affluent simply when the social comparison target earns less; I refer such an 
individual as being in a “superior position”. Alternatively, an individual may 
have a social comparison target who earns more, and another social 
comparison target who earns less; I refer such an individual as being in a 
“middle position”. I use this approach in order to offer an alternative 
explanation to the “heartless rich effect”, whereby I attempt to demonstrate 
why individuals who are in the “superior” position exhibit less prosocial 
tendencies than their “middle” position counterparts. Furthermore, I also 
compare the “heartless rich” phenomenon to other social comparison domains 
(e.g. considering whether those who are more outstanding in their academic 
performance are also less likely to offer help), in addition to those expressed in 
purely monetary terms.  
 
In all these instances, in comparison to individuals in the middle position, 
those in the superior position undertake less perspective taking towards others 
in the inferior position. This leads to a reduction in prosocial behavior towards 
the inferior comparison targets. On the basis of these demonstrated effects, I 
then offer a possible approach to help moderate the “heartless rich” 
phenomenon – via encouraging the “rich” to perspective take by referencing 
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This section is organized in three parts.  First, a review of social comparison 
literature in undertaken, including research into both upward and downward 
social comparison, and the special situation of those who are in the so-called 
“middle position”. Second, this is followed by highlighting the connection 
between social comparison and perspective taking, which offers an 
explanation for why those in “superior position” take less perspective towards 
the inferior compared to those in “middle position”. Third, the effect of 
perspective taking on prosocial behavior is then discussed. 
 
I. Review of the Social Comparison Literature and Being in a Middle 
Position  
 
Within the academic literature, upward and downward comparisons are 
regarded as being the two distinct types of social reference framework. 
Upward comparison occurs when an individual’s target for comparison is 
considered superior in a certain aspect or has outperformed the individual in a 
particular respect. Downward comparison, on the contrary, is when the 





People encounter or seek social comparisons in order to obtain diagnostic 
feedback about their own abilities (Festinger 1954; Wood, 1996). Such 
self-evaluation is often the main motivation for social comparison (Festinger 
1954). Usually, individuals compare themselves to in-group members to 
acquire such diagnostic information, and are particularly oriented towards an 
upward social comparison as this offers them more information about 
self-ability in relation to others. Such recognition of one’s standing in a 
comparative setting is crucial to human evolution due to scarcity of the 
resource possessed by their own social groups (Buunk and Ybema 1997; 
Gilbert 1992).  
 
However, upward social comparison can also bring about negative 
consequences, for it can possibly lower the individual’s level of self-evaluation 
and induce negative affect (Klein 2003; Wheeler and Miyake 1992).  This 
may especially be the case when individuals have little control over their 
situation (Suls and Wheeler 2000). In some cases, indeed, individuals seek to 
forgo this kind of upward social comparison precisely in order to avoid 
possible negative impacts on self-esteem.  This will especially be the case 
when the domain of comparison is core to self-value (Smith and Insko 1987; 
Levine and Green 1984). Under these circumstances, the self-enhancement 
6 
 
motive of social comparison—to boost individual’s self-views—is more 
salient (Suls and Wheeler 2000; Pszczynski et al. 1985). Of course, downward 
social comparison may provide an avenue towards self-enhancement (Tesser 
1988). This not only enhances individuals’ mood (Klein 2003; Gibbons and 
McCoy 1991), but can also improve non-mood related constructs like 
self-evaluation. For example, Gibbons (1999) found that the physical presence 
of a handicapped individual in the room can boost the life satisfaction 
self-rating of non-handicapped individuals in the same space. Van de Zee et al. 
(1998) showed that, as people’s health condition worsens, they are more likely 
to desire information about those who are worse-off. Yet despite this potential 
benefit in terms of enhancing individuals’ mood and self-perception, 
downward social comparison provides less diagnostic information about the 
social environment and one’s relative standing and competitiveness. 
 
In the vast literature on social comparison, upward and downward social 
comparisons have been mostly studied in an independent manner (see Suls and 
Wheeler 2000 for a review of this area). Individuals in social comparison are 
faced either with an upward social comparison, in which the comparison target 
is superior to themselves, or a downward social comparison, in which the 
comparison target is inferior. However, a more realistic common circumstance 
has been largely overlooked, whereby an individual is in a middle position as 
to social comparison.  Both the superior and inferior comparison targets are 
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present at the same time. In this circumstance, self-evaluative and 
self-enhancing motives can be satisfied simultaneously by engaging in both 
upward and downward social comparisons. For example, Taylor and Lobel 
(1989) reported that cancer patients, who would be biased toward making 
downward comparisons with worse-off patients, also prefer to solicit upward 
comparison information, provided by better-off patients, to get motivating and 
inspirational information about their current situation. 
 
Hence, being in the middle position, in terms of social comparison, can fulfill 
individuals’ self-evaluative motive and self-enhancing motive at the same time. 
On the one hand, through the presence of superior comparison targets, 
individuals are served with diagnostic information about their own ability in a 
relative sense. On the other hand, through the presence of inferior comparison 
targets, individuals might avoid the risk of negative affect because inferior 
targets may serve to enhance self-perception. Therefore in the case of middle 
ranking individuals, social comparison can have a more beneficial effect, than 
is the case for either superior or inferior groups.  For individuals in the 
superior position (without the presence of a more superior comparison target), 
social comparison can only be achieved in relation to inferior comparison 
targets. Such social comparison provides less utility for their self-evaluation. 
Therefore, in relation to the “heartless rich” phenomenon, the rich may 
perceive themselves to be in the “superior position” when faced with charity 
8 
 
donation decisions towards those who need help. However, if these same 
individuals were to perceive themselves to be in the “middle position” 
(without any change in their absolute wealth level), the downstream 
consequences of donation behavior towards the inferior comparison targets 
could also be different.  
 
I propose that being in the middle position in terms of social comparison has a 
further important benefit.  It facilitates perspective taking, and thereby 
increases prosocial tendencies towards inferior comparison targets.  
 
II. How Being in the Middle Position Affects Perspective Taking 
 
Perspective taking is a process that involves imagining the world from 
another’s vantage point, or of imagining oneself in another’s shoes (Galinsky 
et al. 2005). Within a social setting, it can be either prompted through 
contextual cues (e.g. individuals are more likely to take the perspective of 
ingroups—see Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000) or used deliberately as a 
strategy (e.g.in negotiations, see Galinsky et al. 2008a). I will establish the 
connection between being in the middle position, in terms of social 
comparison, and the perspective taking towards inferior targets.  This will be 
achieved, first, by explaining why individuals in the middle position may 





Perceived Similarity in Social Comparison 
 
Social comparison is usually theorized as being an automatic and spontaneous 
process (Gilbert et al. 1995). Wegner and Petty (1997) argued that the initial 
stage of the social comparison process is automatic and effortless. When one 
perform social comparisons, contrast effects require little cognitive processing, 
and occur early in the information processing sequence (Wedell 1994; Olson et 
al. 2000). This is also consistent with Heider’s (1958) statement that social 
comparison often plays the: “…role of background or surrounding, which, 
through the effects of contrast, can serve to enhance the participant’s self-view 
or impair it.”  
 
Given this reality, an individual’s response to instinctive social comparison is 
likely to involve a contrast perception away from the social comparison target. 
To this end, those in the middle position encounter both upward and 
downward comparison targets, and the question is then which target would 
serve as the dominant reference point. I propose that the superior comparison 
targets will be the dominant reference point for drawing contrasts. There are 
two reasons for this conjecture. First, people are more sensitively oriented 
towards diagnostic information gathered from upward social comparison 
10 
 
(Smith 2000), because top-down focus is more instrumental to survival than 
the other way around. From evolutionary psychology’s point of view, human 
beings acquire and distribute important resources for living in groups. In this 
context, it is more crucial to know the top-down ranking in the group in order 
to survive than the other way around (Smith 2000). In other words, “knowing 
who is in front of you” is more strategic for survival than “knowing who is 
behind you”. Therefore, for individuals in the middle position, such 
deeply-rooted top-down comparison motivation looms large, and superior 
comparison target is more likely to be used as a dominant reference point for 
social comparison. Second, people are more sensitive towards negative than 
positive information (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). “Losses loom larger than 
corresponding gains” is widely accepted as “loss aversion”. In social 
comparison scenario, individuals in the middle position would experience 
negative self-evaluation and affect through comparison with superior 
comparison target (Suls and Wheeler 2000), but positive affect through 
comparison with inferior comparison target. Therefore, the comparison with 
superior comparison target is more likely to be constructed as a “loss” and 
hence more likely to stand out as a dominant reference point.  
 
Next, as a result of the contrastive mindset away from the superior comparison 
target, I further propose that those in the middle position will then perceive 




Being in the middle position suggests that, in terms of social comparison, there 
is a superior comparison target present, that has eclipsed both the individual 
himself or herself, and also that individual’s own inferior target. The fact that 
both the individual and the inferior target are in relatively less advantageous 
positions, and the possibly shared experience created by their relative 
standings, may enhance the perceived similarity level between the individual 
and the inferior comparison target. When two people have something in 
common, they develop a connection fostered by mutual experience, and may 
act as a relationship unit (Heider 1958). This, in turn, increases similarity 
perceptions and thus positive attitude towards the other individual (Goldstein 
et al. 2014). The shared aspects could originate from common personality 
traits and hobbies, which are considered to be important personal features 
(Tversky 1977), or even seemingly trivial aspects such as shared birthdays and 
clothing (Finch and Cialdini 1989; Garner 2005; Goldstein and Ciladini 2007). 
In addition to shared features, shared experience and emotional resonance 
further adds to similarity perception. For instance, Hodge et al. (2010) showed 
how the experience of giving birth to a child fosters considerable similarity 
judgment and empathic concern towards those with the same experience (also 
see Batson et al. 1996). Buunk et al. (1991) found that the greater the marital 
stress, the greater interest in talking with others about marriage. This “misery 
loves miserable company” phenomenon (Schachter 1959; Kulik and Mahler 
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2000) seems applicable to the middle and inferior targets, in a social 
comparison, when faced with a superior target.  
Therefore, existing findings suggest that the circumstance of being in a middle 
position, in terms of social comparison, will increase individuals’ perceived 
similarity towards inferior comparison targets. Moreover, people may tend to 
over generalize similarity; when individuals identify one thing in common, 
they may expect to have more aspects in common as well (Ames 2004).  
 
Perceived Relationship Closeness in Social Comparison 
 
Another closely related concept involved in the process of social comparison 
is that of perceived relationship closeness. It refers to the mutual dependence 
that exists between people across cognitive, affective and behavioral aspects 
(Kelley et al. 1983; Dibble et al. 2012). Perceived relationship closeness can 
be applied across different relationship types and across different levels of 
interdependence, e.g. romantic relationships, friendships, acquaintances, or 
even for strangers (Dibble et al. 2012).  Relationship Closeness Inventory 
(RCI) is the most commonly used questionnaire that measures the relationship 
closeness of people (Berscheid et al. 1989). One of the important dimensions 
considered is the shared experience and time spent together. Agnew et al. 
(2004) have suggested that perceived similarity and relationship closeness are 




Hence, I propose that for individuals in the middle position of a social 
comparison, the presence of a superior comparison target increases their 
perceived similarity and relationship closeness with inferior comparison 
targets.  By contrast, for individuals in the superior position of a social 
comparison, the absence of a superior comparison target hinders the formation 
of perceived similarity and relationship closeness with inferior targets. 
 
As previously explained, this affinity arises from the middle and lower ranked 
individuals’ shared circumstance of being in a relatively inferior position to 
superior comparison targets.  Upward social comparison is more dominant 
than downward social comparison for individuals in a middle position when 
they are faced with both superior and inferior comparison targets. This is 
because upward social comparison (compared to downward social comparison) 
provides more evaluative values which are important to human survival and 
reproduction (Smith 2000). For individuals in the middle position, such 
dominant contrast comes from the superior comparison target, and creates the 
perceived similarity and relationship closeness with the inferior comparison 
targets, which may foster perspective taking jointly with them.  
 
Next, I will explain in more detail why an individual in the middle position, in 
terms of social comparison, might take the perspective of the inferior 
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comparison target.  
 
Middle Position Facilitates Perspective Taking – The Role of Similarity and 
Closeness Perception 
 
Adopting others’ perspective usually requires motivational effort and, as a 
result, individuals typically do not undertake the process voluntarily (Epley 
and Caruso 2008). On the other hand, stereotyping requires little time and 
effort, and is a more frequently used cognitive strategy to organize social 
information and construct social judgments (Todd et al. 2012). Thus, 
individuals are more likely to adopt the perspective of others’ when their 
particular circumstance favors the requisite motivational drive. In this regard, 
similarity has been shown to be a powerful antecedent to induce perspective 
taking (Stotland 1969; Leyens et al. 2000; Gehlbach et al. 2012).  
 
Relationship closeness has also been demonstrated as increasing the likelihood 
of taking the perspective of others (Pickett et al. 2004；Galinsky et al. 2005). 
Individuals with interdependent self-construal (typically, for example, East 
Asians), who perceive the interpersonal relationship closer than those with 
independent self-construal are more likely to adopt others’ perspectives 
(Vorauer and Cameron 2002). Based on the understanding about perceived 
similarity, perceived relationship closeness and perspective taking with 
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inferior comparison targets, I suggest that, the absence of an even more 
superior comparison target makes individuals in the superior comparison 
condition less likely to take on the perspectives of inferior comparison targets. 
On the flipside, with the presence of a superior comparison targets, individuals 
in the middle position are likely to adopt the inferior comparison target’s 
perspective.  
 
Next, I will elaborate on the connection between perspective taking and 
prosocial behavior. 
 
III. Perspective Taking and Prosocial Behavior  
 
Previous research has documented the beneficial effects of perspective taking 
in reducing intergroup stereotypes (Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000), increasing 
self-other representation overlap (Vescio et al. 2003), and in promoting 
altruistic/helping behavior (Toi and Batson 1982; Goldstein et al. 2014). 
 
Galinsky et al. (2005) regarded perspective taking as forming a vital part of 
the mechanism “to facilitate social coordination and foster social bonds”, 
thereby decreasing intergroup stereotypes (also see Finlay and Stephan 2000; 
Richardson et al. 1994). Moreover, aptitude in perspective taking is also 
positively related to individuals having well developed social competence 
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skills, these being the set of abilities necessary for successful social adaption 
(Davis 1983).  Perspective taking also increases a sense of self-other overlap 
(Cialdini et al. 1997), thus improving social bonds.  
 
Self-other overlap has been proposed in order to explain perspective taking 
and prosocial behavior (Aron et al. 1992; Davis et al. 1996; Galinsky and 
Moskowitz 2000). There are two types of self-other merging put forward by 
Davis et al. (1996). One amounts to applying the self in others, thereby 
perceiving others as possessing similar characteristics of the self, making 
others more “self-like”. This type of self-other merging is usually defined as 
social projection in the literature (Kreuger 2007). To activate this type of 
self-other merging, previous studies had typically instructed participants to 
imagine how another person feels, or how such and such an event could have 
changed his or her life (Batson et al.1997a; Maner et al. 2002).  
 
The other form of self-other merging involves including elements of the other 
in the self, thereby augmenting the extent to which the self possesses the 
characteristics of other people.  The self is, as a result, made more 
“other-like”. This is usually termed as self-stereotyping in the academic 
literature (Galinsky et al. 2008b).  Typical experimental instructions involve 
telling participants to imagine how they themselves would feel in the other 




Both “other-focused” and “self-focused” perspective taking, however, have a 
positive effect in encouraging prosocial behavior. Recent work by Cho (2014) 
has further suggested that “other-focused” perspective taking may be the 
“default mode” of human behavior, since it requires only generic or even 
stereotypical information about the perspective taking target to take place. In 
contrast, having a “self-focused” perspective requires more vivid descriptions 
about the perspective taking target.  This is less likely to happen when 
detailed information about the perspective target is limited.     . 
 
In sum, the existing evidence suggests that perspective taking towards a target 
may invoke development of a better understanding of another’s circumstance 




With regards to the “heartless rich” moniker, I suggest that one possible reason 
for this phenomenon may be that it is a consequence of a relative lack of 
perspective taking on the part of the “rich”. By building connections between 
social comparison and perspective taking, and the relationship between 
perspective taking and prosocial behavior, I propose that individuals in the 
middle position, i.e., those who have both upper and lower referents, are more 
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likely to take the perspective of their inferior comparison targets. This will 
increase their tendency to help the inferior group. With this in mind, this thesis 
will consider the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Being in the middle position (compared to being in a 
superior position) in terms of social comparison will increase 
individuals’ prosocial tendencies towards inferior comparison targets. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect proposed in H1 is mediated by perspective 
taking.  
 
I conducted 7 studies to provide support for the hypotheses. These 7 studies 
are organized into 3 sections. The first section includes a pilot study and Study 
1 whereby the prediction in H1 was tested. The second session includes 
Studies 2, 3A, and 3B in which the role of perspective taking as a mediator 
suggested in H2 is confirmed. The third section includes Studies 4 and 5 in 
which I show that the prosocial tendency effect can possibly spillover to 
helping targets beyond the initial social comparison group (Study 4) and 
enhance an individual’s preference for a more socially responsible brand 










One hundred and twenty five undergraduates from Ohio University 
participated in this study in exchange for course credit and entrance to an iPad 
lottery.  Upon arrival at the test site, the participants were introduced to a 
letter-counting task.  This involved reading a passage on the new features of 
the iPhone6, whilst at the same time counting the number of uses of the letter 
“e” (including the capitalized form) as accurately as possible. Participants 
were told the study was interested in examining whether the frequency of 
vowel usage in a product write-up has an effect on information processing and 
affinity toward the featured product. The effort-based letter counting task was 
pretested and chosen on the basis that those who performed poorly in the test 
(n=57 from a separate pretest) didn’t find the task causing threat to their 
self-esteem (M=3.08; 1=didn’t hurt self-esteem at all, 9=extremely hurt 
self-esteem). This task characteristic helps to minimize any impact arising 
from self-esteem hurt or self-threat. To incentivize participants, they were told 





After the letter counting task, the participants proceeded to the next part of the 
study, which introduced them to the details about how they would be rewarded. 
All participants were told that they had been organized into a subgroup of 
three, and that each subgroup would share a fixed amount of lottery allocation  
represented in i-dollars (1 i-dollar represents 1 chance of entering into the iPad 
lottery: the amount of i-dollars was unknown to the participants and varied 
experimentally). The amount earned by each individual would be based on 
their ranking within the subgroup. All participants were informed that 
“mid-performers”, ranked in the middle of each subgroup of three, earned i$50 
for their participation. They also learnt that the worst-performing “participant” 
earned i$10.  There were six randomly assigned conditions in which the 
manipulation involved varied the amount that best-performing “participants” 
earned (i$50, i$60, i$70, i$80, i$90, or i$100). Participants learned the 
allocation of the lottery in their own subgroup only.  
 
Participants were then asked how many additional i-dollars they would like to 
give to the worst-performing “participant” (who had got i$10).  They could 
fill in any number from zero to the full amount they earned; this served as the 
dependent measure. In order to minimize any potential free-rider effect 
resulting from perceived shared responsibility between the group members to 
give to the low-performer, I adopted the instruction proposed by Erkal et al. 
(2011). Specifically, participants were told that the amount proposed by the 
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two members of the subgroup (these being the high and mid-performers) 
would be randomly selected as the amount that would be allocated to the 
low-performer.  
 
Finally, I assessed the extent to which participants underwent “other-focused” 
(‘to what extent did you concentrate on how the participant who earned i$10 
would feel’), “self-focused” (‘to what extent did you concentrate on how you 
would feel if you were in the position of the participant who earned i$10’), and 
“objective” (‘to what extent did you concentrate on being objective’) 
perspective taking.  Participants chose from a scale ranging from 1 (‘not at 
all’) to 9 (‘very much’) when making their selections (Batson et al. 1997a). 
The winner of the iPad was announced 2 weeks after the study by email, and 
one participant claimed the prize.  
 
Results 
The dependent response (given in i-dollars) was square-rooted so that it would 
better fit a normal distribution. It was found that there was no difference in the 
giving amount allocated to the low-performer among the 5 middle position 
conditions in cases where the “high performer” received more than i$50 
(i-dollar allocation in the subgroup was i$60:i$50:i$10, i$70:i$50:i$10, 
i$80:i$50:i$10, i$90:i$50:i$10, i$100:i$50:i$10)  (F (4,98)=.10, p>.10; 
Mi$60=3.56, Mi$70=3.36, Mi$80=3.29, Mi$90=3.44, Mi$100=3.48). The 5 
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conditions were collapsed into one condition, that being defined as middle 
position condition.  
 
ANOVA results revealed that there was a significant difference between the 
superior position condition (the high performer also got i$50 and the i-dollar 
allocation in the subgroup was i$50:i$50:i$10) and the middle position 
condition (Msuperior=2.28 vs. Mmiddle= 3.43, F(1,123)=8.73, p<.01). Similar 
results were also found from separate contrasts between the superior position 
condition and each of the 5 middle position conditions (Mi$50=2.28 vs. 
Mi$60=3.56, t(1,119)=2.49, p<.05; Mi$50=2.28 vs. Mi$70=3.36, t(1,119)=2.10, 
p<.05 ; Mi$50=2.28 vs. Mi$80=3.29, t(1,119)=1.91, p=.058; Mi$50=2.28 vs. 
Mi$90=3.56, t(1,119)=2.23, p<.05; Mi$50=2.28 vs. Mi$100=3.48, t(1,119)=2.37, 
p<.05).   
 
Mediation analysis (Hayes 2013) was conducted to test H2, thereby examining 
the role of perspective taking in explaining the effect of social comparison 
position on prosocial behavior. Data concerning the combined 
middle-positions and the superior position formed the two levels of the 
independent factor.  The amount of i-dollars donated to the inferior position 
served as the dependent measure. It was found that there was a significant 
mediation through “other-focused” perspective taking (95% CI=.24, 1.09, 
bootstrap=10000). In addition, there was also significant mediation through 
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“self-focused” perspective taking (95% CI= .16, .90, bootstrap=10000). When 
both “self-focused” and “other-focused” perspective taking were included as 
parallel mediators, the mediating effect through “other-focused” perspective 
taking was significant (95% CI=.22, 1.23, bootstrap=10000), while that of 
“self-focused” perspective taking was not. 
 
Discussion 
These results supports H1; participants gave significantly more when framed 
as being in the middle position than when they were placed in the superior 
position. H2 is also supported; the difference in giving amount between middle 
position and superior position participants was mediated by perspective taking. 
“Other-focused” perspective taking was identified as a better mediator than 
“self-focused” perspective taking. 
 
Interestingly, though earning levels for the “high performers” were different in 
comparison to the five middle position conditions (i$60, i$70, i$80, i$90, 
i$100), donation amounts across these conditions were similar. This suggests 
that the effect on the behavior of middle position individuals was insensitive to 
the difference in reward magnitude between the “high-performer” comparison 
and the target participants. It also rules out any reference-point explanation, in 
which the i-dollar allocation of the “high performer” might have been used as 
some kind of reference point by participants to decide on the donation amount. 
24 
 
Admittedly there may be a turning point at which, if the high performer’s 
lottery amount were to exceed a certain high threshold, then his or her helping 
pattern might change (Weber’s Law, Monroe 1973); nonetheless, the effect is 
















Study 1 addresses two design characteristics of the pilot in order to further test 
my hypotheses. First, all participants in the pilot study were assigned as 
“mid-performers” in a subgroup, therefore it is not clear yet whether a 
classification based on real performance would affect the findings. Second, 
even though the scenario setting in the pilot study was prosocial in nature, in 
that the reward was presented as a lottery and participants were giving away 
   Conditions  Giving amount to the  
low performer  
i$50 2.28 (2.02) 
i$60 3.56 (1.12) 
i$70 3.36 (1.77) 
i$80 3.29 (1.89) 
i$90 3.44 (1.75) 
i$100 3.48 (1.43) 
25 
 
their winning chances, the incentive structure may not have been truly 
regarded in tangible financial terms by participants.  If this was the case, then 
the findings may be less reflective of any “heartless rich” effect. To avoid this 
potential problem, Study 1 offered cash rewards to participants (as opposed to 
more favorable participation in the iPad lottery) and adopted real (as opposed 
to false) performance feedback for the letter counting task. 
 
Procedure 
One hundred and fifty nine undergraduates from National University of 
Singapore participated in the study in exchange for course credit and a cash 
reward (1 participant, who didn’t follow instructions, was removed from the 
dataset, as was 1 participant, outside 3 SD of the dependent measure).  Upon 
arrival at the test site, all participants were introduced to the same letter 
counting task that was used in the pilot, and were told that they would be 
rewarded in cash based on their task performance.  
 
Specifically, each member of each subgroup of 3 would be classified into one 
of three performance levels.  Participants with answers which were within +/- 
10 from the correct answer (the precise number of letters) were considered as 
high-performers; those within +/- 11 to 25 were mid-performers; those beyond 
+/- 25 were low-performers. 
Participants then proceeded to the next part of the study, in which they were 
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briefed about the details as to how the cash reward would be allocated. As in 
the pilot, all participants were told that each subgroup of 3 would share a fixed 
amount of cash allocation represented in i-dollars (with the exchange rate of 1 
i-dollar = 0.1SGD).  The relative share would be determined by an 
individual’s performance relative to others in their subgroup. To this end, I 
experimentally manipulated the participants’ share of i-dollars as follows: 
 
i) for high-performers (those who scored +/- 10 away from the correct 
answer), the distribution presented to the participants was 
i$90:i$50:i$10 (with i$50 and i$10 for the two other fictitious 
participants in the group)  
ii) for low-performers (those who scored over +/- 25 away from the 
correct answer), the distribution was i$90:i$50:i$10 (with i$90 and 
i$50 for the two other fictitious participants in the group) 
iii) mid-performers were randomly assigned to either of the two 
conditions; i$90:i$50:i$10 or i$50:i$50:i$10. 
 
All participants learned the allocation of rewards in their own subgroup. 
Participants who were classified as high-performers or mid-performers were 
then asked how many i-dollars they would like to give to the low-performing 
participant in their subgroup. They could fill in any number from zero to the 
full amount with which they had been allocated themselves. Again, in order to 
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eliminate the free-rider effect, I adopted the instruction provided by Erkal et al. 
(2011).  In the case of low-performers, they were asked how many i-dollars 
they expected the high-performer and mid-performer to give to them. I 
measured the three types of perspective taking (Batson et al. 1997a) as was the 
case in the pilot study. I also measured the social value orientation (SVO) (Van 
Lange 1999, see example Appendix 1) of the participants. SVO is a commonly 
used scale to categorize people’s chronic prosocial tendency (Van Lange et al. 
2007), and predict people’s donation behavior in economic games. For 
instance, Cornelissen et al. (2011) found that the individuals who are classified 
as prosocial from their SVO responses exhibit more prosocial tendency in a 
resource allocation game, and the effect is mediated by relationship closeness 
perception. However, non-prosocial people exhibit lower prosocial tendency 
regardless of the extent of relationship closeness. Therefore, I predict the 
prosocial participants in the middle position condition would give more to 
low-performer than those in superior position condition, but there would not 
be any difference between non-prosocial participants from middle and superior 
positions. In addition, responses were also gathered for fairness (‘How do you 
think the distribution of i-dollars among your group is? 1=Not at all fair, 







There were 20 high-performers and 60% of these decided to donate more than 
zero. On average, they donated 11% of their i-dollar reward (calculated by 
average giving amount/ i$90; referred as “giving rate” hereafter. The 
proportion analysis is relevant here because of the different absolute earning 
levels between high-performers (i$90) and mid-performers (i$50). 
 
There were 67 mid-performers: 
1) 32 of these were randomly assigned as mid-performers in the true middle 
position condition (i$90:i$50:i$10). Out of these participants, 78.1% decided 
to give more than zero. The average giving rate was 21.7% of total earnings 
(calculated by average giving amount/ i$50).  
2) 35 were randomly assigned as mid-performers in a superior position 
condition (i$50:i$50:i$10). Out of the 35 who were in the superior position, 
only 65.7% decided to give more than zero. The average giving rate was 
12.4% (calculated by average giving amount/i$50).  
 
This result showed that mid-performers in the true middle position condition 
gave significantly more than both mid-performers in the superior position 
condition and high-performers (21.7% vs. 12.4%, t(1,65)=2.68, p<.01 and 
21.7% vs. 11%, t (1,50)=2.54, p<.05). H1 was supported. There was no 
significant difference identified in giving rate between high-performers and 
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mid-performers in the superior position condition (11% vs. 12.4%, p>.10).  
 
Commonly held beliefs suggest that the rich will donate more to the less well 
off than those on middle incomes. In this regard, participants in this study 
would expect high-performers, who had earned i$90, to give more than 
mid-performers, who had earned i$50. The result in Study 1 confirmed this 
expectation. The expected giving rate, expressed by the low-performers 
themselves, was 18.4% for high-performers and 12.8% for mid-performers. 
However, the actual giving rates for mid-performers in the middle position 
condition was higher than expected (actual 21.7% vs. expected 12.8%, 
t(1,102)= 2.77, p<.01).  Also, the actual giving rate for high-performers was 
lower (marginally) than expected (actual 11% vs. expected 18.4%, 
t(1,90)=-1.84, p=.06). These actual and expected giving rates match well for 
mid-performers in the superior position condition (12.8% vs. 12.4%, p>.10). 
Therefore, higher-performers gave less than they were expected to give; 
mid-performers in the middle position condition gave more than they were 
expected to give.  
 
Next, the moderating effect of Social Value Orientation (SVO) on prosocial 
behavior was examined for each of the social comparison positions. The 67 
mid-performers, who were randomly assigned to either the middle position or 
superior position, were classified into prosocial or non-prosocial subsets 
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according to their SVO responses (see appendix). As was the case with the 
pretest analysis, the DV was square-rooted, thereby giving an amount that 
could be fitted within a normal distribution. The main effect for position 
manipulation and prosocial tendency was significant (F(1,63)=4.66, p<.05; 
F(1,63)=7.72, p<.01). There was also a significant interaction effect 
(F(1,63)=4.75, p<.05). The results, moreover, remained significant when 
controlling for fairness perception, and emotions did not affect giving amount. 
Simple contrast results suggested that there was a significant simple contrast 
for prosocial participants (Mmiddle=3.72 vs. Msuperior=2.07, F(1, 63)=8.83, 
p<.01), but not for the non-prosocial participants (Mmiddle=1.84 vs. 
Msuperior=1.85, F(1.63)=0, p>.10). Therefore, being in the middle position is 
not likely to encourage prosocial behavior on the part of individuals who are 
dispositionally non-prosocial. 
 
Moreover, a mediation analysis, conducted using the “PROCESS” method 
(Hayes, 2013), revealed a significant indirect effect through “self-focused” 
perspective taking (95% CI= .03,.43, bootstrap=10000), and also through 
“other-focused” perspective taking (95% CI=.04,.54, bootstrap=10000). When 
both “self-focused” and “other-focused” perspective taking were included in 
one model as parallel mediators, the result showed that only the mediating 














 Expected giving rate 
estimated by the 
low-performers 










(i$90: i$50: i$10) 
12.8% 21.7% 78.1% 
Mid-performers  
(superior position) 
(i$50: i$50: i$10) 
12.8% 12.4% 65.7% 
High-performers 
(i$90: i$50: i$10) 
18.4% 11.0% 60.0% 





Prosocial 3.72(1.25) 2.07 (1.77) 2.97 (1.70) 
Non-Prosocial 1.84 (1.63) 1.85 (1.49) 1.84 (1.53) 




In support of H1 and H2, the findings revealed that participants in the middle 
position condition were more prosocial than those in the superior position 
condition, and that the effect was mediated by perspective taking. The stronger 
indirect effect achieved through “other-focused” perspective taking was 
consistent with findings in the pilot study. 
 
In the pilot test, as previously discussed, all participants were ranked as 
“mid-performers” regardless of the actual outcome of their letter test. In this 
study, the ranking of participants were based on their real performance, and I 
obtained consistent findings. This suggests that both randomly manipulated 
position (as in pilot study) and real performance-based position categorization 
(as in the current study) have similar effects on the participants’ subjective 
perceptions of their relative position in a social comparison. This finding also 
suggests that, in addition to any potential dispositional factor that may be 
responsible for the relationship between (mid-) performance and prosocial 
tendency (Erkal et al. 2011), a situational factor (namely relative ranking in 











So far, the pilot study and Study 1 have demonstrated that perceived relative 
position in social comparison can influence prosocial behavior towards 
inferior comparison targets. In both studies, the extent of perspective taking 
was measured. For Study 2, I used the moderation-of-process approach, in 
which I directly manipulated the psychological process (i.e., perspective 
taking) that participants would undertake. If the relative lack of perspective 
taking is responsible for the lower prosocial orientation of individuals in the 
superior position under a comparison context, then encouraging these 




Two hundred and nineteen undergraduates from National University of 
Singapore participated in this element of the study in exchange for credit 
benefits and a cash incentive (2 participants who had already participated in 
Study 1 were removed from the dataset, as were 3 participants whose 
responses were outside 3 SD of the dependent measure). As was the case with 
previous studies, the participants began by completing the letter counting task. 
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After finishing the task, they then proceeded to the reward stage. Participants 
were assigned either to the middle position condition (i$90:i$50:i$10) or a 
superior condition (i$50:i$50:i$10).  
 
However, unlike in previous experiments, in this case 4 different instructions 
types were given to 4 randomly assigned subgroups of participants.  These 
were: 1) No instruction 2) Objective instruction 3) Imagine-other instruction 4) 
Imagine-self instruction (see Appendix, Batson et al. 1997a; Davis et al. 1996). 
Participants with the “no instruction” condition received no specific 
instruction, as in previous studies. Participants with the “objective instruction” 
condition were instructed to remain objective when making their decision 
about what amount to give to the low-performer in the subgroup. Such an 
“objective instruction” has been shown to be effective in reducing perspective 
taking (Batson et al. 1997a; Vescio et al. 2003; Vorauer and Sucharyna 2013). I 
predict that mid-performers, in receipt of the “objective instruction” would 
give less to the low-performer in the subgroup than those in the “no 
instruction” condition. The “imagine-other instruction” asked participants to 
focus on the low-performer’s thoughts and feelings.  The “imagine-self 
instruction” led participants to focus how they themselves would think and 
feel if they were in the low-performer’s condition.  The “imagine-other 
instruction” and the “imagine-self instruction” have both been shown to be 
equally effective in increasing participants’ perspective taking tendency and 
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thereby promoting generous behavior (Batson et al. 1997a; Cho 2014). I 
predict that mid-performers in these two conditions would give more than 
those in the “objective instruction” condition. The perspective taking 
manipulation checks were applied in the same way as in previous studies.  
 
Results 
An index that measured the relative focus of perspective taking was derived to 
assess the impact of the manipulation check (this being objective perspective 
divided by average of self-focused and other-focused perspective taking). 
Those who were in the “objective instruction” group reported a relatively 
higher level of focus on remaining objective (Mobjective=2.03 vs. 
Mno-instruction=1.48, t(1,215)=1.90, p=.058; Mobjective=2.03 vs. 
Mimagine-other=1.06,t(1,215)=3.37, p<.01; Mobjective=2.03 vs. Mimagine-self=1.24, 
t(1,215)=2.76, p<.01).  
 
The amount donated to the low-performer was examined to test H1. As in the 
previous study, this amount was square-rooted in order to better fit a normal 
distribution. 
 
Within the middle position conditions, ANOVA revealed that there was a 
significant difference between some of the responses of the various instruction 
subgroups (F(3,106)=2.77, p<.05). Participants in the objective instruction 
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subgroup, in particular, gave less than those from other conditions 
(Mobjective=2.02 vs. Mno-instruction=2.84, t(1,106)=1.68, p=.09; Mobjective=2.02 vs. 
Mimagine-other=3.10, t(1,106)=2.18, p<.05; Mobjective=2.02 vs. Mimagine-self=3.32, 
t(1,106)=2.73, p<.01). There was no significant difference between the 
behavior of the no-instruction, imagine-other, and imagine-self condition 
subgroups (p-values >.10).  
 
For the participants placed in a superior position, ANOVA also showed a 
significant difference between responses according to the instruction 
conditions that had been administered (F (3, 105)=3.11, p<.05). There was no 
significant difference for participants between the no-instruction and objective 
instruction conditions (Mno-instruction=2.00, Mobjective=2.35, t(1,105)=.77, p>.10). 
However, participants in the two perspective taking conditions (imagine-other 
and imagine-self) gave significantly more than those in the no-instruction 
condition (Mimagine-other=3.06, Mimagine-self=3.13 vs. Mno-instruction=2.00, 
t(1,105)=2.87,p<.01). Participants from the two perspective taking conditions 
(imagine-other and imagine-self) also gave more than those in the objective 




In summary, regardless of their relative position in terms of social comparison, 
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those participants who had received the objective instruction condition gave 
significantly less to the low performers than those who had received 
perspective-taking instruction conditions. There was no difference between the 
behavior of members with the “imagine-other” and “imagine-self”conditions. 
Within the set of participants who received the no instruction conditions, those 
in the middle position of social comparison gave more than those in the 
superior position condition, replicating previous findings. These results further 
confirm the role of perspective-taking in explaining the relationship between 
social comparison and prosocial behavior towards inferior comparison targets. 
In addition, it is demonstrated that explicit prompting to take the perspective 
of the less well-off can augment prosocial tendency (even within the “heartless 
rich”), but that efforts to be objective shift one away from being prosocial. 
 





 Middle position Superior Position 
No instruction 2.84 (1.69) 2.00 (1.71) 
Objective instruction 2.02 (1.84) 2.35 (1.31) 
Imagine-other instruction 3.10 (1.76) 3.06 (1.79) 





Study 1 and Study 2 provided consistent support for the proposed prosocial 
inclination of individuals in the middle position in terms of social comparison, 
and also for the mediational role of perspective taking. However, these effects, 
so far, have only been tested in a prosocial context, where the participants 
were asked about giving an amount to an inferior comparison target. One 
possible concern about this approach, however, is whether the effects 
demonstrated are contingent upon them being in a prosocial context (e.g., 
actually having the opportunity to donate). Study 3A seeks to demonstrate that, 
even in the absence of explicit donation prompts, the proposed similarity and 
closeness perception process will still be present. 
 
Procedure 
The study was conducted on Amazon M-Turk (Crump et al. 2013). One 
hundred and ninety three participants (43% female) took part, completing the 
assignment as instructed. As was the case in previous studies, participants 
performed the “letter counting task” and were then informed that they had 
been assigned to a subgroup of three and rewarded by i-dollars based on their 
letter counting performance. One i-dollar represented one chance of entering 




All the participants were assigned as mid-performers (i$50) in the subgroup. 
Those participants in the middle (superior) position condition, learned the 
allocation of i-dollars in the subgroup was i$90:i$50:i$10 (i$50:i$50:i$10) for 
high-performer, mid-performer, and low-performer respectively. The 
participants were asked about perceived similarity with the other two members 
of their subgroup (‘To what extent do you feel the participant in your subgroup 
who is getting XXX is similar to you?’: 1 Not at all similar - 9 Extremely 
similar, Ames 2004), and then about relationship closeness with both the high- 
and low-performers in the subgroup (IOS Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale, 
Aron et al. 1992, 0-100 slider scale). Half of the participants rated their 
relationship closeness to the high-performer first, and then their relationship to 
the low-performer; the other half rated the items in the opposite order. 
 
Results 
An ANOVA was conducted, using social comparison position and evaluation 
sequence as the independent variables, and perceived similarity as the 
dependent variable. There was no significant sequence difference regarding 
similarity perception (for the high-performer (F(1,189)=1.12, p>.10); for the 
low-performer (F(1,189)=1.92, p>.10)) and there was also no interaction 
between perceived similarity perception and sequence (p>.10). Similarly, there 
was no significant sequence difference regarding relationship closeness (for 
high-performer (F(1,189)=.19, p>.10); for low-performer (F(1,189)=.12 
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p>.10)), and there was no interaction between perceived relationship closeness 
and sequence (p>.10). Thus the two sequences were combined together to 
conduct further analysis.  
 
Compared to participants in the middle position condition, those in the 
superior position condition perceived that they were more similar to the 
high-performers (Mmiddle=4.53 vs. Msuperior=6.33), t(1,191)= 6.08, p<.001). 
Participants in the middle position condition perceived themselves to be more 
similar to low-perfomers than to those in the superior position condition 
(Mmiddle=4.66 vs. Msuperior=3.88, t(1,191)= 2.75, p<.01). Moreover, the results 
for relationship closeness for high-performers and low-performers showed a 
similar pattern: participants in the superior position condition perceived 
themselves to have a closer relationship with high-performers than with those 
in the middle position condition (Mmiddle=37.08 vs. Msuperior=56.37, t(1,191)= 
5.35, p<.001).  Participants in the middle position condition perceived 
themselves to have a closer relationship with low-performers than with those 
in the superior position condition (Mmiddle=39.76 vs. Msuperior= 28.90, 
t(1,191)=3.16, p<.01).  
 
Discussion 
To summarize, the results confirmed that social comparison position 
manipulation (between the superior and the middle position) influenced levels 
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of similarity perception and relationship closeness with both the 
high-performer and low-performer in the subgroup.  This was the case even 
when there were no donation prompts. In others words, the effects documented 
in the previous studies are unlikely to depend on the existence of any prosocial 
context. The results were also consistent with our other key hypothesis: 
participants in the middle position exhibited a higher level of similarity 
perception and relationship closeness towards the low-performer in the 
subgroup than they did to those in the superior position condition.  This held 
true even though the absolute amount they had been awarded was the same 
(i$50).  The results of Study 3A were also consistent with the previous 
theoretical argument about the positive correlation that exists between 
perceived similarity and relationship closeness for such a newly established 


















Study 3B was conducted in order to further confirm the role of similarity 
perception and relationship closeness in affecting participants’ perspective 
taking and prosocial tendency. This was achieved through manipulation of 
participants’ similarity perception towards the social comparison target. All 
participants in Study 3B, for this reason, believed they were in the middle 
position condition. I then adopted classic manipulation techniques in thought 
generation (participants were asked to generate either 2 or 10 similarities with 














































the high-performer in their subgroup) in order to manipulate participant 
similarity perception with the high-performer in the subgroup (Schwarz et al. 
1991; Novemsky et al. 2007). Judgment fluency (ease / difficulty of generating 
reason) for a particular judgment would influence individuals’ certainty about 
the decisions they reached.  For example, people become more assertive 
when they perceive ease of self-assessment (Schwarz et al. 1991). In the 
current study, for the “2 similarities” condition, participants were asked to 
think about 2 similarities they have with the high-performer in their subgroup 
(which would be considered easy with high fluency and thus would increase 
participants’ belief of being more similar to the high-performer). For the “10 
similarities” condition, the participants were asked to think about 10 
similarities they have with the high-performer in the subgroup (which would 
be considered difficult with low fluency and thus would not increase 
participants’ belief of being more similar with the high-performer). A control 
condition, in which no thought-generation instruction about similarity with the 
high-performer was given, was also included. 
 
In the case of the “2-similarities” condition, the higher similarity perception 
achieved with the high-performer (compared to similarity perception for the 
no-instruction condition and 10-similarities condition) would tend to make 






Seventy five participants (64% female) from National University of Singapore 
completed the study as instructed in exchange for course credit.  As was the 
case for previous studies, participants first performed the “letter counting task” 
and were then led to believe that, based on their performance in the task, they 
had been assigned to a subgroup of three and rewarded by i-dollars. In this 
case, 1 i-dollar equated to to 0.1 SGD, which they could claim as cash after the 
experiment. However, unlike in previous studies, there was no superior 
position condition. All participants were assigned as the mid-performers in 
their subgroups.  They learned the allocation of i-dollars in the subgroup was 
i$90:i$50:i$10 for high-performer, mid-performer, and low-performer 
respectively.  
 
Participants were then randomly assigned to the 3 conditions mentioned above 
(2 similarities – 10 similarities - control). They were then asked how much 
they would like to give to the low-performing participant in their subgroup. 
They could fill in any number from zero to the full amount with which they 
have been awarded. Again, in order to eliminate the free-rider effect, the 




I also measured the three types of perspective taking, namely objective, 
other-focused, self-focused perspective taking (Batson et al. 1997a). Finally, as 
a manipulation check, participants were explicitly asked about perceived 
similarity (‘To what extent do you feel the participant in your subgroup who is 
getting XXX is similar to you?’: 1 Not at all similar - 9 Extremely similar), 
and relationship closeness with the high-performer in the subgroup (IOS 




The manipulation check confirmed that the participants perceived that their 
similarity with the high-performer in the subgroup was higher in the case of 
the “2 similarities” condition than for the “10 similarities” or “no instruction” 
conditions (similarity perception: M2-similarities=5.04 vs. M10-similarities=4.28, t(1, 
72)=2.03, p<.05; M2-similarities=5.04 vs. Mno-instruction=3.92, p<.05), t(1,72)=2.99, 
p<.01; Mno-instruction=3.92 vs. M10-similarities=4.28, t(1,72)=.96, p>.10). 
 
The manipulation check also confirmed that participants perceived their 
relationship closeness with the high-performer in their subgroup to be greater 
in the case of the “2 similarities” condition than they did for the “10 
similarities” or “no instruction” conditions (relationship closeness: 
M2-similarities=46 vs. M10-similarities=32.40,t(1,72)=2.45, p<.05; M2-similarities=46 vs. 
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Mno-instruction=30.32, t(1,72)=2.82, p<.01; Mno-instruction=30.32 vs. 
M10-similarities=32.40, t(1,72)=.37, p>.10).  
 
As in previous studies, the dependent response (measured in i-dollars given) 
was square-rooted to better fit a normal distribution. A one-way ANOVA 
revealed a significant difference in giving amount (F(2, 72)= 4.08, p<.05). As 
anticipated, participants in the “2 similarities” condition gave significantly less 
than those in the “10 similarities” or “no instruction” conditions 
(M2-similarities=2.10 vs. M10-similarities=3.28, t(1,72)=2.82,p<.01; M2-similarities=2.10 
vs. Mno-instruction=2.85,t(1,72)=1.79, p=.077; Mno-instruction=2.85 vs. 
M10-similarities=3.28, t(1,72)=1.02, p>.10).  
 
Further mediation analysis, conducted by the PROCESS method (Hayes, 
2013), revealed the existence of a significant indirect effect achieved through 
“other-focused” perspective taking (95% CI=-.49,-.04, bootstrap=10000), but 




In this study, all participants were assigned to the “middle position” condition. 
There was increased perceived similarity and relationship closeness with the 
high-performer in the subgroup in the case of the “2 similarities” condition 
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(Novemsky et al. 2007), compared to the perceived similarity in the “10 
similarities” condition or “no instruction” condition. Strengthened similarity 
perception and relationship closeness with the superior comparison target led 
to less perspective taking and prosocial tendency exhibited towards the 
inferior comparison target in the subgroup. By manipulating the level of 
similarity perception with the superior comparison target, this study further 
tested how similarity perception with the superior comparison target (the 
high-performer) can influence the similarity and closeness perception towards 
the inferior comparison target (the low-performer), thus changing prosocial 
tendency.  The findings therefore suggest that the proposed “middle position 
approach”, for addressing the “heartless rich effect”, will be relatively more 
effective when those in the middle position bear a lower level of connection to 
superior comparison targets. 
 




Study 4 adopts an academic performance comparison setting. This is intended 
to extend the generality of my findings, and will also minimize the role of any 
alternate explanations that stem from the mental representation of money and 
the associated numerical range effect. Furthermore, to develop my assessment 
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of prosocial behavior, I examined willingness to help (donating time 
potentially rather than donating money). I also assessed prosocial behavior 
towards unrelated targets entirely outside of the comparison group (i.e., 
underprivileged African children). 
 
The use of an academic social comparison setting served two further purposes. 
First, the letter-counting task, used in the previous studies, is one in which 
poor performance is unlikely to create any threat to self-esteem. I am 
interested to test whether the previously established effect still holds true for 
an explicitly ability-based social comparison, which is more central to 
self-value.  I chose a measure of the academic performance of the student, a 
poor result in which could potentially damage self-esteem.  
 
Second, since social comparison based on academic ability can potentially 
cause self-threat (Klein 2003; Duclos et al. 2012). Given so, a heightened 
prosocial tendency that is caused by a social comparison of academic ability 
may be a result of a self-esteem restoration process (Klein 2003; Duclos et al. 
2012), as opposed to the perspective-taking account that I propose. In this 
regard, I suggest that a self-threat mechanism that bolster prosocial behavior 
for individuals in the middle position is unlikely to take place. For individuals 
in the middle position, while it is possible that the comparison with the 
superior targets may temporarily lower their self-esteem and the presence of 
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an inferior comparison target may help them to bolster their self-esteem as 
well. Simply put, the extent of self-threat will be buffered by the presence of 
an inferior comparison target (i.e., by the self-affirmation from comparison 
with the inferior target), making self-worth unlikely to need repair.  
 
Nonetheless, I included a self-affirmation condition in this study to help 
discount the self-threat alternate account. The most frequently used 
self-affirming strategy involves promoting individual’s self-values in areas that 
are crucial to his or her identity (Sherman and Cohen 2007).  For example, 
stating important values in life has been found to be effective in reducing 
self-threat (Shira and Martin 2005; Gao et al. 2008). After the self-affirming 
procedure, the motivation to repair self-worth should be dampened (Steele 
1988) and hence individuals are unlikely to engage in prosocial behavior to 
bolster the self. In other words, if prosocial tendency were found to be 
sensitive to the procedure whereby the presence (absence) of a prior 
self-affirmation strategy decreases (increases) prosocial behavior, a self-threat 
account could not be ruled out. On the other hand, my perspective-taking 
account predicts that prosocial tendency towards the inferior comparison target 
would not be influenced by the self-affirmation procedure.  
 
Another important purpose of Study 4 is to test whether the previously 
established beneficial effect of being in the middle position group can be 
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carried over to promote prosocial behavior towards unrelated targets outside of 
the comparison group. I propose that this activated perspective-taking 
tendency may be carried over to targets outside of the initial social comparison 
context for two reasons. First, perspective taking has been found to be closely 
associated with interdependent self-construal, by which individuals tend to 
include others in self concept and have closer psychological relationships with 
people in general (Vorauer and Cameron 2002). It is therefore possible that, 
once perspective taking tendency has been made active, it will shift 
self-construal to be more interdependent towards general targets who need 
help. To this end, the previous academic literature has documented that 
self-construal is amenable to temporary activation (Markus and Kitayama 
1991; Schwartz 1994), and that interdependent individuals perceive 
themselves to be more connected to others as a result.  Inevitably they give 
more importance to group goals and relationships and exhibit enhanced 
prosocial tendency toward those who need help (Utz 2004). Second, cognitive 
control theory suggests that, once a cognitive state is made active, the same 
mindset might endure effortlessly across similar situations (Dewitte et al. 
2009;Botvinck et al. 2001；Miller and Cohen 2001). Along these lines, it is 
likely that, when perspective taking tendency is activated for an inferior 
comparison target needing help, it could also be carried over towards other 




On the other hand, Dovidio et al. (1990) have suggested that initial perspective 
taking towards a person in need does not facilitate the provision of assistance 
towards that same person for a subsequent helping request (initial help with 
thesis project vs. later help with other projects, taken from Dovidio et al. 1990). 
This was explained through the phenomenon of diminished sympathetic 
concern towards the helping target on the part of the perspective taker after 
having acceded to the first helping request. As a result, my prediction 
concerning a possible carry-over effect relates to a different helping target, 
who has not received support from the perspective taker.  The effect 
demonstrated by Dovidio et al. (1990) is therefore likely to be less applicable. 
 
Procedure 
Two hundred and thirty-two undergraduates from Ohio University participated 
in the study in exchange for class credits (4 participants, who didn’t complete 
the study as instructed, were removed from the dataset). Participants were told 
that the university is going to publish a book, which includes a section on its 
students. They were told they would be shown two student profiles (from 
many others) that are being considered for inclusion in the publication, and 
that they need to evaluate the profiles. This setting effectively facilitated a 
social comparison within campus. Participants were given first either an 
outstanding or a normal student’s profile (including name, year, achievements 
and comments from peers). They then provided their opinions about the 
52 
 
described student profile, with respect to the student’s academic performance, 
social skills, and overall evaluation (1 very poor – 9 very extraordinary). The 
gender and name of the profile were customized for females (Wynne) and 
males (Wayne), while other descriptions (for example of academic 
performance etc.) remained equal.  
 
Next, participants were given a passage describing the work of the university 
Counseling and Psychological Service (CPS) and information about the profile 
of a typical student who would benefit from CPS help. They were asked 
whether they would like to be a volunteer for CPS during the next semester 
(choice question 1 Not at all - 9 Very much).  This would involve helping 
targets who are students from the same university and have difficulty adapting 
to campus life. After a separate filler task, participants were then given a 
poster promoting a charity organization called ANPPCAN, whose mission is 
to improve the welfare of African children. They evaluated the poster quality 
(by color, design and content) and were asked whether they would like to 
become a volunteer worker for ANPPCAN (choice question 1 Not at all - 9 
Very much).  
 
In an alternate condition, the sequence of the tasks was changed.  After 
evaluating the outstanding or normal students’ profile, the participants 
considered the ANPPCAN poster, and reported on their likelihood of 
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becoming an ANPPCAN volunteer.  Finally they read about the CPS and 
indicated likelihood of becoming a CPS volunteer.  
 
One further condition was also tested.  In this condition, the participants also 
started by evaluating the profile of an outstanding student.  But before they 
carried on to other tasks, they were asked, in addition, to spend 5 minutes 
describing two important values in their lives, this being a standard 
self-affirmation procedure used to repair self-threat (Shira and Martin 2005; 
Gao et al. 2008).  
 
Therefore, Study 4 is a 2 (CPS first vs. ANPPCAN first) by 3 (middle position, 
superior position, affirmed middle position) full-factorial study. I also 
measured the three types of perspective taking, as in previous studies, and 
relationship closeness with both the CPS students and ANPPCAN children (‘to 
what extent do you use “we” to describe the relationship between you and 
“XXX”?’ 1 Not at all, 9 Very Much, adopted from Cialdini et al. 1997). 
 
Results 
The manipulation check used to ascertain the level of outstanding vs. normal 
student profiles was successful (Overall evaluation Moutstanding=5.61 vs. 
Mnormal=4.97 t(1,230)=7.40, p<.001). The importance of helping people was 
similar across conditions (p>.10). The manipulation check for relationship 
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closeness was also successful; participants felt closer to and would be more 
likely to use “we” to describe a relationship between them and CPS students 
who need help than African children (MCPS=5.40 vs. MANPPCAN=4.16, t 
(1,231)=8.22, p<.001). Female participants expressed higher tendency towards 
helping for both types of disadvantaged targets (CPS Mwomen=4.31 vs. 
Mmen=3.59,t(1, 230=-2.85, p<.01; ANPPCAN Mwomen=4.61 vs. 
Mmen=4.00,t(1,230= -2.32, p<.05), as is consistent with findings documented 
in previous literature (see Beutel and Johnson 2004). However, analyses also 
showed that gender did not moderate the proposed effect, so it will not be 
discussed further in this paper. 
 
For the CPS-ANPPCAN condition, participants in the middle position 
condition were more likely than participants in the superior condition to help 
CPS students (Mmiddle= 4.44 vs. Msuperior=3.49, t(1,71)= 2.50, p<.05). A process 
analysis revealed a significant mediation effect in this case through both 
self-focused perspective taking (indirect effect 95% CI= -.81, -.14, 
bootstrap=10000) and other-focused perspective taking (indirect effect 95% 
CI= -.76, -.09, bootstrap=10000) (Hayes, 2013). Treating the two as parallel 
mediators, “other-focused” perspective is again the sole significant mediator 
(indirect effect 95% CI= -.90, -.05).  Furthermore, participants from the 
middle position condition were also more likely to express desire to help 
African children through ANPPCAN (Mmiddle= 4.75 vs. Msuperior=3.95, t(1,71)= 
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1.88, p=.064). Regression was conducted using the first DV to predict the 
second DV, and the significant results suggested that participants in the middle 
position, who were more willing to help the CPS students, were also more 
willing to help the African children (Beta=.41, F(1,34)= 7.01, p<.05). This 
supported the theory that the influence of perspective taking can be carried 
across from one target needing help to another; or alternatively, it may simply 
be a reflection of a general response-consistency effect. Lastly, the 
self-affirmation procedure itself didn’t affect the helping tendency of 
participants towards both types of target needing help (Mmiddle= 4.44 vs. 
Maffirmed-middle=4.74, p>.10).  This suggested that the existence of any 
self-threat account was unlikely to be responsible for the effects observed from 
middle position conditions. 
 
For the APPCAN-CPS sequence condition, the participants in the middle 
position condition were again more likely to help African children than those 
in superior position condition (Mmiddle= 4.76 vs. Msuperior=3.68, t(1,73)= 2.30, 
p<.05). This finding is consistent with the finding of Duclos et al. (2012) that 
people suffering from ego threat donated more money to their favorite charity 
to repair self-esteem. Somewhat unexpectedly, there was no difference in this 
cohort’s subsequent decision making, concerning the prospect of helping CPS 
students; mediation through perspective taking in this case was also not 
significant. As a result, the response-consistency alternate explanation for the 
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earlier CPS-APPCAN sequence seems less probable in light of the lack of a 
similar effect in the AAPCAN-CPS sequence.  
 
In fact, a self-affirmation account appears able to explain these unexpected 
(null) findings. Specifically, when helping targets are not socially comparable 
inferiors (so, for example, when they are African children), the absence of any 
self-enhancement inferior target may have impacted the self. Hence the 
self-affirmation effect through prosocial behavior was then detected.  As a 
result, the helping tendency towards the African children was significantly 
lower for participants who underwent the self-affirmation procedure (Mmiddle= 
4.76 vs. Maffirmed-middle=3.83,t(1,76)= 2.13, p<.05). Furthermore, after the 
self-esteem was boosted, and in the case of both middle and affirmed-middle 
conditions, the helping inclination no longer spilled over to other deserving 
targets. 
Table6: Willingness to Help  
(CPS-ANPPCAN sequence) 
DV- willingness to help CPS 
students from the same school 
DV- willingness to help ANPPCAN 
children from Africa 
Superior Position 3.49(1.76) 3.95(1.35) 
Middle Position 4.44(1.50) 4.75(2.20) 
Middle Position with affirmation 4.74(1.90) 4.47 (2.07) 
(ANPPCAN-CPS sequence) 
DV- willingness to help 
ANPPCAN children from Africa 
DV- willingness to help CPS students 
from the same school 
Superior Position 3.68(1.97) 3.26(2.11) 
Middle Position 4.76(2.07) 3.46(1.64) 




It is clear that the effect of active perspective taking can be carried over and 
augment subsequent helping behavior towards unrelated others who are in 
need of assistance. However, somewhat unexpectedly, my findings also 
suggest that perspective taking spillover only takes place when the spillover 
source was from an initial socially comparable inferior target (e.g. CPS 
students attending the same university) rather than from more remote targets 
(e.g. African children).  From this result it could also be inferred that it was 
the perspective taking activated by social comparison, rather than by prosocial 
tendency in general, that is carried over to a different target in need of help. 
 
When the initial helping targets were not socially-comparable (e.g. African 
children), individuals in the middle position condition may not actually 
perceive themselves to be “in the middle”.  This is due to the absence of any 
comparable inferior comparison target. In this respect, a self-threat mechanism 
(based on the upward social comparison), that is consistent with findings in 
Duclos et al. (2012), seems to be active, as deduced from the effects of 









It has been established that individuals in the middle position in terms of social 
comparison behave more prosocially. Building on this finding, Study 5 
examined whether such individuals would prefer products or brands that bear a 
prosocial positioning.  
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be a good indicator for such 
prosocial positioning of a brand. CSR refers to prosocial actions undertaken by 
companies (Turban and Greening 1997), which most commonly take the form 
of corporate philanthropy or socially responsible employment practices (Sen 
and Bhattacharya 2001).  Consumers’ reaction to CSR depends upon C-C 
(Consumer-Company) congruence, this being the level of perceived overlap 
between the company’s values and those of its customers (Sen and 
Bhattacharya 2001).  Such C-C congruence can satisfy the self-definitional 
need (for self-enhancement and self-distinction) and, in turn, boost preferences 
towards that brand (Curras- Perez et al. 2009).  Since individuals in the 
middle position of a social comparison (as opposed to the superior condition) 
engage in more perspective taking and behave more prosocially, they tend to 
share values, within the prosocial domain, with brands perceived to have high 
CSR.  Therefore, individuals in the middle position of a social comparison 
are more likely to have high C-C congruence with high-CSR brands. As a 
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consequence, their preference for the high-CSR brands would be higher.  
 
The academic literature on “delegated philanthropy” provides additional 
support for this view (Benabou and Tirole 2010).  Company’s CSR policies 
have been found to respond with a high degree of sensitivity to stakeholders’ 
(including consumers) demands that they exercise good citizenship type 
behavior.  It is also true that consumers may use their consumption of goods 
or services from a high-CSR branded company as a channel for showing their 
personal determination to “do good”. Therefore, from the angle of “delegated 
philanthropy”, consumers with active prosocial tendency (activated by being 
in the middle position) are more likely to prefer a high-CSR brand.  
Consumers in superior position are, of course, less likely to show this 
characteristic. These arguments are, moreover, consistent with “balance 
theory”, in which the cognitive consistency motive serves as a driver for 
psychological balance (Heider 1958). In particular, individuals with prosocial 
tendency would also prefer a brand with prosocial value in order to maintain 
cognitive consistency and balance (see also the P-O (Person-Organization) fit, 
Kristof 1996).  Hence, I predict individuals in a middle position of a social 
comparison (compared to those in superior condition) would demonstrate an 






A pretest (n=31) was conducted among NUS undergraduate students to select 
pairs of brands that differed in perceived CSR (‘To what extent do you think 
XXX is a socially responsible company?’: 1 Not at all - 9 Very much), but not 
in actual level of preference (‘How much do you like the brand XXX?’: 1 Not 
at all -9 Very much).  Based on this test, 3 pairs of brands were selected: 
Twitter vs. Instagram; Disney vs. Universal; and BMW vs. Ferrari. Twitter, 
Disney and BMW had a higher perceived level of CSR than Instagram, 
Universal and Ferrari respectively (p-values<.05). However, overall 
preferences for these pairs of brands were similar (p-values>.10). 
 
Procedure 
One hundred and twenty three undergraduate students from NUS participated 
in Study 5 in exchange for course credit.  As was the case in Study 4, 
participants were told that the university was going to publish a book, which 
would include a section on its students. They were told they would receive two 
student profiles (from many others) that might potentially be included in the 
publication.  Their task would be to evaluate the profiles. This setting, 
therefore, amounted to a social comparison within campus. The participants 
were given first either an outstanding or a normal student’s profile (including 
name, year group, achievements and peer comments). They then provided 
their opinions about the described student profile with respect to that 
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individual’s academic performance, social skills, and overall evaluation (1 
very poor – 9 Very Extraordinary). The gender and name of the profile were 
varied for female (Wynne) and male (Wayne) participants, while other 
descriptions (e.g. academic performance etc.) were kept equal.  
 
Next, participants were given a passage describing the university Counseling 
and Psychological Service (CPS), together with the profile of a typical student 
who is in need of CPS help.  
 
Finally, they were asked to state their preference for the 3 pairs of brands, 
delivered in randomized order (‘How much do you like the brand XXX?’, 1 
Not at all - 9 Very much).  
 
Results 
The manipulation check to ascertain student profile’s levels (overall evaluation) 
was successful (Moutstanding=7.42 vs. Mnormal=6.64, t(1,121)=4.98, p<.001). The 
importance of helping people was similar across conditions (p>.10).  I 
calculated two index variables as DVs: preference for high-CSR brands (by 
averaging preferences shown toward Twitter, Disney, and BMW), and 
preference for low-CSR brands (by averaging preferences for Instagram, 
Universal, and Ferrari).  It was found that in the case of middle position 
condition participants, preference for high-CSR brands was significantly 
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higher than their preference for low-CSR brands (Mhigh-CSR=7.03 vs. 
Mlow-CSR=6.61, t(1,61)=3.93, p<.001).  For superior position condition 
participants, preference for high-CSR and low-CSR brands didn’t differ 
significantly (Mhigh-CSR=6.69 vs. Mlow-CSR=6.59, t(1,60)=1.24, p>.20). 
 
Discussion 
It has been shown that social comparison position influences participant 
preference for brands with different levels of social responsibility. Consumers 
showed increased preference for high-CSR brands when there was a superior 
comparison target available, than when there was only an inferior comparison 
target available. However, when the available comparison target was not 
sufficiently superior, such augmented preference for high-CSR brands didn’t 
appear. Therefore, consumers in the middle position may prefer brands or 
products with more prosocial positioning (for example environment-friendly 
brands). This study also deepens our understanding of consumers reactions to 
product and brand prosocial positioning. Consumer-Company congruence is 
found to depend not only on the shared values between the consumer and the 







Table 7: Brand Pretest Table 
 





Across all seven studies, my findings suggest that being in the middle position, 
compared to being in a superior position, whether this is expressed in financial 
or non-financial terms, can increase individuals’ prosocial tendency towards 
inferior comparison targets. The effect is mediated by perspective taking.  
The activated perspective taking process, induced by the social comparison, 
can be carried over to others perceived as being in need of help. This spillover 
can even lead to an increased preference for brands with high CSR.  
 
 Pair 1  Pair 2 Pair 3 
 Twitter Instagram Disney Universal BMW Ferrari 
Preference 7.10(1.10) 7.00(1.37) 6.26(0.90) 6.35(1.05) 6.71(1.10) 6.58(1.28) 
Perceived CSR 6.26(0.97) 5.90(0.65) 6.48(1.12) 5.97(1.05) 6.26(0.97) 5.74(1.48) 
  Middle Position   Superior Position  
Preference for 
high-CSR brands 
    7.03(0.88)   6.69(0.95) t(1,121)=2.10, p<.05 
Preference for  
low- CSR brands 
 
 
6.61(1.08)  6.59(1.01) t(1,121)=.09, p>.90 
  t(1,61)=3.93, p<.001  t(1,60)=1.24,p>.20  
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Contribution to Social Comparison and Prosocial Behavior Literature 
 
In this section, the similarities and differences between the existing literature 
and my current research will be summarized.  In the process, the contribution 
made by this thesis to broader scholarly understanding will be clarified.  
 
1）Research with unrelated helping targets:  
Isen (1970) found that participants receiving very positive performance 
feedback on a perceptual motor-skill task, being boosted by the “warm glow of 
success”, donated more to charity than those receiving very negative feedback. 
Duclos et al. (2012) found that self-threat, induced by upward social 
comparison, causes individuals to donate more to their favorite charitable 
organization. While both of these research papers focused on prosocial 
behavior towards an unrelated target, their findings are clearly inconsistent 
with each other.  
 
A possible reconciliatory explanation for this inconsistency may lie in the level 
of manipulation of the social comparison present in each study.  Duclos et al. 
(2012) manipulated social comparison in a very moderate way, by asking the 
participants to evaluate the photographs of more attractive students. The 
moderate self-threat occasioned motivated individuals’ prosocial behavior to 
repair the self, which is consistent with self-affirmation theory. In contrast, 
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Isen (1970) gave very extreme feedback to participants about their 
performance in the assessed task (“way above/below average,” “extremely 
good/bad”).  This had the potential to hurt or enhance self-esteem to a much 
larger extent, and in turn caused severely-threatened individuals to regard 
unrelated prosocial opportunities as being less instrumental in boosting the 
self. 
 
In my research, I have focused on prosocial behavior exhibited towards an 
inferior comparison target from the initial comparison context. Furthermore, 
the choice of a non-self-threatening effort-based task (the pilot study and the 
task in Studies 1, 2, 3a, 3b) helps to isolate the role of self-threat or 
self-affirmation from my framework. For Study 4, which involved a 
“moderately” self-threatening comparison setting relating to 
academic-performance, the findings (in the ANPPCAN-CPS condition) are 
consistent with the self-threat or self-affirmation account towards prosocial 
behavior. 
 
2) Research with related helping target:  
Klein (2003) reported that participants in a downward comparison condition 
were more likely, than those in an upward social comparison condition, to help 
the same inferior comparison target in another task. In this study, the helping 
target was either an upward comparison target or the downward comparison 
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target. In the current research, however, the helping target is always the 
downward comparison (or inferior) target and my focus is on the contrast 
between the behavior of those with only downward comparisons available, and 
to those with both upward and downward comparisons. This fills a gap in the 
existing literature on social comparison. 
 
3) Research concerning general prosocial behavioral change across time:  
Yip and Kelly (2013) found that individuals who underwent either upward or 
downward social comparison generally engaged in less prosocial behavior.  
They measured prosocial behavior through a list of behavioral checks 
administered two days after the social comparison manipulation.  Checks 
related to a range of behaviors from letting people cut line in front of you to 
giving a friend a spontaneous hug. The explanation in this case relates to a 
reduction in empathetic concern towards others.  
 
As was the case with Isen (1970), Yip and Kelly (2013) also gave extreme 
feedback to participants (e.g. that they scored in the 97th percentile relative to 
peers). This manipulation may have created relatively severe hurt to the self of 
participants, which could have rendered the self-boosting qualities of daily 
prosocial behaviors to be less effective. Furthermore, the heightened emotional 
consequence corresponding to such manipulation might also translate into 
lessened empathic concern (Yip and Kelly 2013).  
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While my examination of the carry-over effect of perspective taking in Study 4 
does not strictly represent a temporal assessment of prosocial behavior, the 
presence of a spillover effect to the benefit of other helping-targets nonetheless 
suggests the possibility that the perspective-taking effect may be more than 
transient in facilitating prosocial behavior. This empirical demonstration 
awaits further research efforts.  If confirmed, a comparison with Yip and 
Kelly (2013) has the potential to yield additional insight. 
 
To summarize, although the previous literature has explored the relationship 
between social comparison and prosocial behavior, the findings are in conflict. 
Against this background, my research uniquely examines how “being in the 
middle position” (with both upward and downward social comparison targets 
present at the same time) influences individuals’ perspective taking towards 
the downward social comparison target.  The research finding is conclusive: 
the presence of a downward social comparison target has the effect of making 
“middle position” individuals behave more prosocially.  
 
 
Contribution to the Literature on Perspective Taking  
 
The findings in Study 4 (concerning perspective taking carry-over) may also 
seem inconsistent with existing research that has demonstrated the existence of 
“group specific” perspective taking. Vescio et al. (2003), for example, 
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documented that perspective taking activated toward African Americans didn’t 
carry over to “women” or “gay” groups. Shih et al. (2009) showed that 
perspective taking towards Asians didn’t carry over to White or African 
American groups. Wang et al. (2014) showed how perspective taking and 
willingness to support a homeless person didn’t carry over to helping a man 
with African descent. In all these examples, there was no carry-over of 
perspective taking onto the second group, possibly because targets within the 
second group were not perceived as being in need of help. In contrast, the 
spillover group in Study 4 were “African children” being cared for by 
ANPPCAN (a charity organization).  They were clearly perceived to be in 
need of help and possibly, in addition, laden with social identity that 
encourages helping behavior.   
 
Another possible point of difference is in the potentially distinct (stereotypical) 
social identities that the second groups in those existing studies may have 
carried with them (from “gay” to “African American”).  Skorinko and 
Sinclair (2013) found that clear and deeply-rooted negative stereotypes may 
not be diminished by perspective taking.  Furthermore, the taking of the other 
group’s perspective in this case can even worsen the negative stereotype in 
question. To this end, the spillover group in Study 4 were “African Children” 





Galinsky et al. (2005) argued that, unlike most cognitive processes and 
mindsets, perspective taking tends to be group-specific, because the purpose of 
perspective taking is the “formation and maintenance of specific social bonds”. 
However, the extensive existing research on priming (see a recent review 
Barge and Chartrand 2014), mindsets (Gollwitzer 1990, deliberate vs. 
implemental mindset; Dweck et al. 1995, entity vs. incremental mindset; 
Galinsky and Kray 2004, counterfactual mindset) and construal level (Freitas 
et al. 2004; Malkoc et al. 2010, abstract vs. concrete mindset) suggests, on the 
contrary, that cognitive process can persist and carry across time to later tasks.  
It does not matter whether such cognitive process is conscious or unconscious 
(Barge and Chartrand 2014). But there are boundaries for such mindset 
carry-over.  A perceived difference in information processing cue may shift 
individuals’ mindset.  Wan and Agrawal (2011), for example, demonstrated 
how a perceived resource drop causes a change to lower-construal mindset 
(preferring feasibility over desirability attributes).  Malkoc et al. (2010) 
showed that a different time format (date format vs. delay format) leads to a 
more abstract mindset and less hyperbolic discounting. In relation to the 
domain of perspective taking, therefore, it is likely that the activated 
perspective taking mindset stops functioning, or shifts away, when individuals 
have different perceptions about any second group of targets. Specifically, 
when the second group are described as “gays” or “African Americans”, and 
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there is no explicit instruction to take their perspective, individuals may 
perceive them to be less in need of help and apply negative stereotypes. 
However, when the second group of targets are “African children”, cared for 
by ANPPCAN, who are endorsed with fewer negative stereotypes and 
perceived as being more in need of help, then the previously activated 
perspective taking mindset is likely to carry over and motivate individuals to 
behave more prosocially. In other words, perspective taking may be “group 
specific”, when another group of targets are perceived differently or less in 
need of help.  But it may carry over, when a second group of targets are 
perceived to be similarly in need of help as the initial socially-comparable 
group. The current research, therefore, provides a possible boundary condition 
for perspective taking to carry over, further developing our understanding of 
this area.   
 
Moreover, throughout my research, other-focused perspective taking has been 
confirmed as a valid mediator associated with prosocial behavior. Specifically, 
individuals apply their own knowledge or perspective when taking the 
perspective of an inferior comparison target. This is consistent with theories 
put forward in the previous literature that suggest that “other-focused” 
perspective taking (egocentric projection), as opposed to “self-focused” 





Indeed, a significant body of research confirms the prevalence of egocentric 
projection. Epley and Caruso (2008) showed how individuals who are engaged 
in “self-presentation” actually are not presenting themselves to others; instead 
their criteria are more consistent with their personal values. People 
undertaking “self-presentation” may be presenting primarily to themselves 
(Leary et al. 1995). The false-consensus effect refers to the cognitive bias of 
overestimating the similarity of other people’s opinions to one’s own (Marks 
and Miller 1987). The spotlight effect, in which individuals overestimate how 
much others actually notice their behavior, also confirms overuse of 
self-knowledge (Gilovich et al. 2000). Finally, when individuals try to take on 
others’ perspectives, their judgments inevitably remain egocentric, especially 
in the case of ingroup members with high similarity perception (Ames 2004). 
The adjustment for egocentric judgment is often simply insufficient, even 
when taking the perspective of outgroups (Epley and Caruso 2008). Therefore, 
the current research contributes to the literature on perspective taking by 
offering additional empirical evidence that “other-focused” perspective taking 
(egocentric projection) seems to be the more influential process in shaping 
prosocial behavior. 
 
This thesis also makes a contribution to social identity theory. In Study 3A, the 
perceived similarity and closeness between middle position individuals and 
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their inferior comparison target resonates with the “minimal group paradigm” 
(Tajfel et al. 1971), in which participants were grouped by simple tasks such as 
the “dot estimation task” (e.g. as overestimators and underestimators, see 
Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000).   
 
The findings in Study 3B, namely that perceived similarity and closeness to 
one target may influence feelings towards another target are also consistent 
with previous research.  For example, Tarrant et al. (2012) found that 
perspective taking has less effect in decreasing negative stereotypes 
concerning outgroups when individuals are highly identified with their own 
ingroup. It is difficult for individuals, who are strongly identified in this way, 
to establish connections with others (Riketta 2005; Todd and Burgmer 2013). 
Although the manipulation of perceived similarity is subtle, in this body of 
research, it is sufficient to induce ingroup favoritism towards those who share 
the same group label. My research further demonstrates that individuals are 
able to detect any subtle similarity, and behave more prosocially as a result 
towards their ingroup, even when there is no direct group labeling 
manipulation. Simply involving a superior comparison target can effectively 
change the social cognitive process and prosocial tendency.  
 
All in all, this suggests the possibility that social identities may be formed 
through a dynamic process of social comparison. Available comparison targets 
73 
 
are so important in coining individuals’ social identity. If a society has a 
widening gap between rich and the poor, then the “superior position condition” 
may be more reflective of reality, where wealthy people are naturally bonded 
with their rich companions (Tajfel 1979; Turner et al. 1987). As a result, they 
become less likely to help the poor or identify with any united social identity 
(e.g. as one nation). Since inequality between rich and poor seems to be an 
inevitable outcome of economic growth (Hess et al. 2014), “the middle 
position” provides a possible approach to mitigate the discrepancy 
psychologically. For instance, the forming of a more diverse community, or 
making comparison targets from diverse backgrounds readily available on 
media, could facilitate the sense of a united communal identity and thereby 
enhance overall prosocial tendency. 
 
Limitations  
It is worth mentioning that the role of empathy is not included in this 
framework. Though empathy has admittedly been recognized as a construct 
closely related to prosocial behavior (Batson 1987; Batson et al. 1997b), 
Penner et al. (2005) have theorized that: “empathic responses precede many 
prosocial acts, but certainly not all”. Indeed, there are many cases (especially 
from the literature on perspective taking) where empathy plays only a minor 
meditational role in prosocial behavior. For instance, Vescio et al. (2003) have 
found situational attributions to be a stronger mediator than empathy in the 
74 
 
relationship between perspective taking and the intergroup attitude. Dovidio et 
al. (2004) showed how perceptions of intergroup injustice mediate the effect of 
perspective taking on prejudice reduction. More recently, Grant and Gino 
(2010) suggested that gratitude expression can enhance individuals’ prosocial 
behavior. This is because experience of gratitude makes individuals think, 
from others perspective, about how his or her self is socially valued by that 
other. In all the above research, prosocial behavior is closely related to 
perspective taking but has little to do with empathy. 
 
On the other hand, the connection between perspective taking and prosocial 
behavior is argued to be largely cognitive rather than affective. Galinsky et al. 
(2005) have stated that “although many scholars have suggested that 
perspective taking increases feelings of sympathy and empathy, I suggest that 
the cognitive consequences of perspective taking are critical mechanism 
behind its ability to facilitate social coordination and foster social bond”. In 
this regard, though the role of empathy in encouraging prosocial behavior is 
evident, perspective taking seems to offer a broader construct that may lead to 
separate cognitive (self-other overlap) and affective (empathy) consequences, 




In sum, this research contributes to the literature in the following way:  
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1)  It extends our understanding of social comparison by investigating the 
unique “upward plus downward” comparison effects of “being in the middle 
position”;  
2)  It adds to the literature on prosocial behavior by uncovering another 
antecedent that encourages prosocial proclivity;  
3)  It highlights a possible boundary for the perspective taking carryover 
effect, which has been already documented in the perspective taking literature, 
but was not yet fully understood.  
 
This thesis, therefore, offers a simple and compelling explanation to provide a 
reason why the rich in our society may be relatively “heartless”. The absence 
of any superior comparison target negatively impacts the extent of perspective 
taking from better-off individuals. There are specific implications that follow 
for those involved in encouraging philanthropic behavior.  It is particularly 
important for charity campaigners to create a sense of broad social connection. 
On the one hand, this should provide “the rich” with more superior 
comparison targets of their own, in an attempt to place them in what amounts 
to a “middle position” if at all possible.  Of course, work should also be 
undertaken that fosters comparative links between “the rich” and those inferior 
comparison targets needing help. On the other hand, another possible approach 
to soften “the rich”, thereby reducing feelings of superiority, is through 
humbling; this process draws attention to comparison targets who are not 
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necessarily economically wealthier but are nevertheless superior in other 
inspiring qualities. There are also implications for company branding strategy.  
In regions where the societal environment is competitive and consumers are 
likely to encounter more superior comparison targets, it is may be especially 
beneficial to build up brands and products with a very powerful prosocial 
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Appendix 1:  
 
SVO Scale Instructions 
In this set of questions, we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly 
paired with another person, whom we will refer to simply as the “other.” Other 
is someone you do not know and that you will not meet in the future. Both you 
and Other will be making choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. Your 
own choices will produce points for yourself and Other. Likewise, Other’s 
choice will produce points for him/her and for you. Every point has value: The 
more points you receive, the better for you, and the more points Other receives, 




In this example, if you chose A you would receive 500 points and Other would 
receive 100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and Other 
500; and if you chose C, you would receive 550 points and Other 300. So, you 
see that your choice influences both the number of points you receive and the 
number of points the other receives. 
 
Before you begin making choices, keep in mind that there are no right or 
wrong answers – choose the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. 
Also, remember that the points have value: The more of them you accumulate, 
 
A  B  C  
You Get  500 500 550 
Other Gets  100 500 300 
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the better for you. Likewise, from the Other’s point of view, the more points 
s/he accumulates, the better for him/her. 
For each of the nine choice situations below, circle A, B or C, depending on 
which column you prefer most. 
 
SVO Scoring: 
Regarding this example, A is competitive option, B is prosocial option, C is 
egocentric option. The participants were presented with 9 such questions with 
different amount combinations. In the current study, a participant was 
considered to be prosocial if he or she has consistent prosocial responses for 
















Objective Instruction: When you make the decision, try to be 
as OBJECTIVE as possible about what happened to the participant who got 
i$10. To remain objective, do not let yourself get caught up in imagining what 
this person has been through and feels as a result. Just try to be objective and 
detached. 
 
“Imagine-other” instruction: When you make the decision, try 
to IMAGINE how the participant in your subgroup who got i$10 feels about 
the reward. Try not to concern yourself with attending to all the information 
presented. Just concentrate on trying to imagine how the other participant 
feels. 
 
“Imagine-self” instruction: When you make the decision, try 
to IMAGINE how you yourself would feel if you were in the other 
participant’s (who got i$10) position. Try not to concern yourself with 
attending all the information presented. Just concentrate on trying to 
imagine how you yourself would feel. 
